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THE DELICATE ART OF BALANCE-RUMINATIONS ON
CHANGE AND EXPECTANCY IN LOCAL LAND USE
JAMES E. BROOKSHIRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
When considering the new, it is always important to remem-
ber the old. If change is the constant, then wise reactions to
change rest on a firm grasp of time and place-a firm hold on
perspective. No question exists that much strident debate con-
tinues today regarding the Constitution's provision for just com-
pensation and the concept of regulatory takings. Many people
see the rise of this debate as being tied to change. Almost all see
the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause as a bulwark
in favor of the individual against the admittedly lawful preroga-
tives of the majority to govern.' Some people see the constitu-
tional obligation embodied in the Fifth Amendment as a condi-
tion subsequent on the exercise of compensable sovereign power,
i.e., an exercise of power creating compensable interference re-
mains valid, so long as the constitutional due (just compensa-
tion) is available when required. A few people go even further,
seeing the Fifth Amendment's protection as a throttle on the
power of the majority to act in the first instance. On the oppo-
site extreme, certain individuals view the just compensation pro-
vision as a somewhat anachronistic constitutional redundancy, a
rough equivalent of the Due Process Clause.
Although the takings litigator has few luxuries, it is at least
true that resolving a particular takings case does not require re-
solving the broader issues. With the benefit of this observer sta-
* President of the Federal Circuit Bar Association and Vice-Chair of the Takings
Committee of the Court of Federal Claims Bar Association; currently serving as Dep-
uty Chief, General Litigation Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division
of the United States Department of Justice. The structure and contents of this Arti-
cle express the Author's own views and are in no way expressive of, or binding up-
on, the Department.
1. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment states "[Nior shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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tus, litigators can see in this policy dialogue the great respect
that all of the participants have for our system's broader prem-
ise of informed debate. It is not the litigator's function to suggest
a more or less desirable view. Others are better informed to do
that. This piece will not focus on that policy dialogue, nor will it
focus on the takings jurisprudence itself. This author recognizes
that other contributors to this symposium are in a better posi-
tion to provide those insights.
Instead, this Article is a personal reflection on the experiences
of local land-use systems. It will view those systems as they
have practiced the delicate art of balancing change and expec-
tancy in day-to-day land-use decisions for now over 100 years.
The local land-use tools utilized to accommodate change and ex-
pectancy include a range of vital and diverse approaches. Those
tools reveal a tradition of pragmatic day-to-day dialogue where
those individuals who propose use and those who plan use do
something extremely simple: they talk. They pursue an accom-
modation between land-use goals and individual plans. Along
the way, this Article highlights cases that both recognize the
myriad existing constitutional expectancies and fashion frame-
works for measuring the creation of new expectancies.
This Article begins by looking at today's growth challenges,
using the Washington, D.C. metropolis as a reference point.
From there, the Article reaches backward to trace some of the
Supreme Court's major zoning rulings. Here, the Article high-
lights a few of the cases that cross a broad reach of constitution-
al provisions and that provide the corner pieces for the land-use
puzzle by delineating the broad borders of permissible zoning.
Then, the Article turns to the wellspring and residuum of zoning
authority: the state and local levels. With these points of refer-
ence, the Article moves through enabling statutes, ordinances,
and comprehensive plans. As it proceeds, the Article shows that
the accommodation of change and expectancy occurs routinely
and that it does so with increasing precision as the decision-
making body becomes more localized. Finally, arriving at the
local level, the Article describes still other tools, ranging from
nonconforming uses to variances, which assure balance between
community land-use goals and expectancy. Through this ap-
proach, the Article will have travelled a terrain marked by day-
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to-day challenges and pragmatic innovation; one that features a
tradition of bridging land-use goals and individual expectancy.
This pragmatic environment owes its existence, at least in
part, to the Supreme Court's remarkable judicial sensitivity
when resolving fundamental land-use issues implicating a broad
array of constitutional provisions. With the wider perspective of
constitutional land-use litigation, one gains an even broader
grasp of the Court's land-use remedies. One sees a Court that is
active in assuring constitutional fit in land-use programs. The
Court's decisions indicate that it invokes a strong sense of con-
stitutional place and time, an essential element when gauging
the perception of change or the need for change, even in land use.
Each of these lessons provides comfort. In fact, some portion
of the message of the Supreme Court's recent cases may be sim-
ply to remind the community of the importance of being sensi-
tive to the long-standing tradition of land-use balance.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF LOCAL GROWTH-
A "REAL TIME" SAMPLER
The days of local courts and land-use planners are filled with
activities such as maintaining values, providing ever growing
demands for service, stabilizing the economic base, maximizing a
diminishing resource base, encouraging new investment, restor-
ing the environment, and improving the quality of life. The halls
of legislatures and town councils reverberate daily with the com-
peting demands confronting those individuals bold enough to
attempt to represent the people in these times. People who ad-
vance the cause of land use as well as people who regulate the
use bring goodwill, hard work, and creativity to countless negoti-
ations that attempt to accommodate reasonable expectancies of
use with legitimate public goals. Over the years, the government
has responded to the struggle between these themes by develop-
ing local government land-use regulatory structures.2
Occasionally, the debate crystallizes enough to make its way
to the Supreme Court and to trigger constitutional dialogue.' In
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. See, e.g., Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Am-
bler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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earlier times and settings, society managed to find ways to bal-
ance the debate. The Court's more recent decisions on local land-
use planning concerns demonstrate that society continues to bal-
ance competing interests.4 Given the nature of land-use plan-
ning, the constitutional search for balance has been, is, and will
be a constant effort.
More frequently, the balance is fashioned in a pragmatic day-
to-day world without triggering constitutional tension or court
involvement. Balance is fashioned in local legislatures, town
councils, zoning boards, land-use planning offices, and local
courts in everyday America. Prime among today's planning con-
siderations are transportation, accommodation of growth within
existing communities, maintenance of community values, and
growth in area revenue bases.5 The suburbs around the Wash-
ington metropolitan area offer an excellent microcosm for study-
ing today's land use and community growth phenomena.
In Charles County, Maryland, comprehensive land-use plan-
ners attempt to preserve agricultural ambiance in a way that
fosters growth around existing communities.6 To balance these
goals, Charles County has resorted to transferable development
rights (TDRs), also used in Calvert and Montgomery counties in
Maryland.7 Development rights for the agricultural lands are
transferred, for value, to lands in areas where county managers
want to encourage growth, thus channelling the expansion into
certain areas.8 Growth still raises challenges. Residents of
northwestern Charles County recently debated a proposal to
4. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394-97 (concluding that the city's interest in regulating
use trumped the individual's concern over the value of his property); Dolan v. City
of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (noting that land-use planning although "laud-
able" can only go so far before it becomes unconstitutional).
5. See Nancy H. Dacek, Down on the Farm in Montgomery, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,
1995, at C8.
6. See Caroline E. Mayer, On 2 Coasts, A Search for Limits to the Sprawl That
Appals: Outlying Md. and Va. Counties Scramble To Plan and Preserve, WASH. POST,
Mar. 25, 1995, at El.
7. See id.
8. See Dacek, supra note 5, at C8 ("The county must be diligent in promoting lo-
cal agricultural products, cultivating links between grocery stores, restaurants and
other markets for the county's produce and preserving support services needed by
farmers. It must balance environmental, health and zoning regulations against the
economic needs of the agricultural community.").
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convert 2250 acres of forest into a mixed-use development, in-
cluding retail and commercial space, a golf course, and residen-
tial units projected to attract up to 12,000 occupants.9 Oppo-
nents of the growth raised concerns over the impact on local
historic sites, on traffic accessibility, and on the ecosystem. '
Advocates accepted that change and growth would, in any event,
occur and stressed the value of utilizing planned growth."
Howard County, Maryland, hosts the planned community of
Columbia where county executives continue to struggle with
growth along Interstate 270.12 In that county, after a measure
passed in the polls requiring major zoning questions to be sub-
mitted to a referendum and a county executive veto, the county's
five council members nonetheless voted to exempt "floating
zones.""3 These zones included special districts for the town of
Columbia, Maryland and rural businesses. 4 In an even more
rural area of Maryland, Frederick County, local zoning preserves
agricultural lands by providing that no more than three lots may
be subdivided from any size farm. 5 At the other end of the
spectrum, Calvert County, which utilizes TDRs and has imple-
mented a new acquisition program, is currently buying more
land than it is developing. 6
The struggle for dominion is not always one between the gov-
ernment and the individual. In some instances, governments
contend with each other. Poolesville, a city in Montgomery
County, Maryland, found itself astride the question of annexing
1177 acres in connection with plans to locate a private educa-
tional center in the town. 7 Advocates for the center and for an-
9. See Ann O'Hanlon, Charles County's Growing Pains, WAsH. POST, July 20,
1995, at B1.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Anna Borgman, Council Votes To Undercut Question B, WASH. POST, Feb.
9, 1995, at Howard Weekly sec. Md. 1.
13. See id. A "floating zone" refers to a zoning technique whereby a locality
adopts a zoning district but does not map it until a developer asks to have the
"floating zone" applied to his property. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §
6.63 (3d ed. 1993).
14. See id.
15. See Mayer, supra note 6, at El.
16. See id.
17. See Louis Aguilar, Poolesville Votes Saturday on the Shape of Its Future,
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nexation stressed that the center would spark water supply im-
provements and the upgrading of public education facilities. 8
County officials, however, preferred to maintain the Poolesville
acreage as open space. 9 Poolesville officials responded to the
county's efforts by challenging the validity of the county's open
space concern, pointing to the county's location of incinerators,
police firing ranges, and public golf courses near the town.2"
Inside the infamous "Beltway," already developed communi-
ties confront change and demands for further growth. Counties
emphasize redevelopment by encouraging growth near transpor-
tation centers and existing growth hubs.2' One redevelopment
technique, "infill," the development concept of building on lots in
long-existing neighborhoods,22  brings its own challenges.
Today's consumer demands, especially for homes constructed on
infill lots, require the use of all of the lot's development potential
under existing zoning ordinances. The resulting structure may
stand in stark contrast to homes next door, built years ago,
when there was a smaller demand on the building itself.' Even
the competition among various environmental goals, a noble
struggle, can find distinctly different solutions encouraging dis-
tinctly different growth patterns. A few years ago, in response to
water quality concerns, planners encouraged low density devel-
opment.' Later, after some success addressing basic water
quality levels, planners began to focus on air quality, only to
find that high density development boosted air quality.26
In an area of Fairfax County, Virginia, known as "Difficult
Run," some homeowners lived for nearly forty years without
sewer lines.27 A developer recently proposed a solution: waiving
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1995, at Montgomery Weekly sec. Md. 1.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Caroline E. Mayer, In Old Neighborhoods, Lots of Contention, WASH. POST,
Apr. 29, 1995, at El.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See Mayer, supra note 6, at El.
26. See id.
27. See Ann Mariano, In Fairfax, a Fight for Sewer Lines, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,
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the one residence-per-acre zoning requirement if the developer
provided sewer access to the residents within the zone. On one
hand, this proposal raised concerns over the environmentally
sensitive area and the need to maintain the neighborhood. On
the other hand, acceptance of the proposal would promote public
health and safety interests and the opportunity for some devel-
opment.' In Fairfax, the balance between a proposed mixed de-
velopment (townhouses and single-family residences) and con-
cerns over the historical and archaeological aspects of a certain
site triggered a zoning variance on density restrictions.29 The
developer offered to restore a historical house in the develop-
ment tract and to create recreational areas in exchange for the
variance."0
In Prince William County, Virginia, the development plan has
recently focused on local highways, even though two interstate
highways run through the county. The county has adopted rules
restricting the size of commercial signs along the highways, re-
quiring tree buffers, and limiting highway entrances on many
highways in the jurisdiction.3 Businesses have opposed these
new rules, arguing that they depend on visual access of custom-
ers from the roads and that this aesthetic effort imposes a very
real economic cost on them.32 County planners have responded
that the rules are less stringent than those of nearby counties
and that the rules make an effort to accommodate existing de-
velopment.33 That is, the rules are on a sliding scale, stricter
restrictions apply along rural road stretches and more flexible
burdens govern more developed areas.'
Some people see "low density" growth, which usually involves
growth along the length of roads and the provision of utilities
1995, at El.
28. See id.
29. See Melissa Hall, Fairfax City's Historical Decision, WASH. POST, Nov. 23,
1995, at Fairfax Weekly sec. Va. 1.
30. See id.
31. See Michael D. Shear, Prince William Debates 'Visual Clutter" on Roads,
WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1996, at B1.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
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primarily to households, as expensive."5 They reason that low
density environmental costs are also high because they are
spread over a wide area.31 In contrast, they may argue in fa-
vor of development focusing on existing communities, trying to
emulate traditional towns and villages with compact growth
and disincentives to other development. 7 For instance, some
people have argued that this approach in the Chesapeake Bay
watershed has saved some $11 billion in road construction
costs and, in Maryland, has saved almost 400,000 acres of farm
and forest land."5
In Northern Virginia, Loudoun County is currently trying to
manage its growth. Recognizing the attraction of its rural life-
style and less expensive environment, local government repre-
sentatives have expressed concern that development should not
outstrip the community's ability to provide the related infra-
structure?9 As a result, county supervisors recently deferred
development in the western area of the county until sites in
the eastern sector, where infrastructure was less expensive,
filled out.4
Deferral of growth has its own costs. In a county where the
population of 109,000 is double what it was in 1980, most of the
people live in the eastern sector.41 That concentration has shift-
ed political influence and, as a result, the historic practice of fa-
voring the agricultural lifestyle of the western half of the county
is now coming under fire.42 Debate has arisen over earlier prac-
tices of allowing developers to achieve higher densities in the
eastern end of the county if they agreed to purchase land in the
western county's open-space areas.43 For their part, western
county residents worry that the costs of increased infrastructure
35. See Lee Epstein, A Sensible Alternative to Sprawl, WASH. POST, May 7, 1995, at C8.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Mayer, supra note 6, at El (noting that elementary schools cost $10 million,
middle schools cost $17 million, and high schools cost $35 million each to build).
40. See id.
41. See Peter Pae, Loudoun's Population Shift Is a Tale of 2 Counties, WASH.
POST, Jan. 29, 1995, at B1.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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for the eastern county will lead necessarily to increased tax
rates and that they will not receive added services or benefits for
their tax dollar."
As these examples from the Washington suburbs illustrate,
myriad day-to-day issues face those individuals charged with
development decisions at the local level. Those issues highlight
an important underlying theme in local land use, the constancy
of the struggle to balance competing goals and interests. As di-
verse as these settings are, however, land-use planning does not
occur in a legal vacuum.
III. THE OUTER CONTOURS: LOCAL LAND-USE REGULATION
A. The Supreme Court's Role in Local Land Use
The Supreme Court's contribution to the land-use concepts of
quality of life and the balance between the majority and the in-
dividual traces well into the last century and covers a host of
provisions. Several early Court cases addressed the challenge of
a changing society by outlining when the state's "police power"
could be used to restrict what had come to be seen as "obnox-
ious" uses.
1. "Police Power" as the Justification for Local Land-Use
Planning
Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park45 dealt with waste transporta-
tion through the village limits of Hyde Park, Illinois.46 Al-
though holding a franchise to carry offal and animal waste
through the town limits, Fertilizing Company found itself sub-
ject to a subsequently enacted ordinance prohibiting such trans-
portation.4' The village brought criminal charges under the or-
dinance against a railroad engineer and railroad employees for
transportation of the waste.4 Sustaining the exercise of the
county's police power, the Court focused on "the fundamental
44. See id.
45. 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
46. See id. at 664.
47. See id. at 665-66.
48. See id. at 665.
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principle that every one [sic] shall so use his own as not to
wrong and injure another. To regulate and abate nuisances is
one of the [police power's] ordinary functions." s
The often-cited Mugler v. Kansas"° decision also addressed
what was thought, by the majority of the day and location, to be
an undesirable use.51 A statute implementing Kansas's consti-
tutional prohibition of liquor sales was invoked against Mugler
for the manufacture of liquor at a preexisting plant without a
newly required permit. 2 Again sustaining the police power ex-
ercise, the Court reasoned:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by
individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the
health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is not-and,
consistently with the existence and safety of organized soci-
ety, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State
must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses
they may sustain,... by a noxious use of their property, to
inflict injury upon the community."
Several years later, in L'Hote v. City of New Orleans," the
Court considered the constitutional implications of an 1897 New
Orleans ordinance precluding houses of "ill repute" outside a
specified area of the city.55 L'Hote owned, and with his family
resided in, property located within the designated area.56 He
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance, contending
(as did other property owners and the Church Extension Society
of the Methodist Episcopal Church) that the assignment of pros-
titution to the area reduced property values and portended
neighborhood deterioration.57 The Court first outlined what was
not pending before it: no prostitute was challenging the
49. Id. at 667.
50. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
51. See id. at 661-62.
52. See id. at 653-54.
53. Id. at 669.
54. 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
55. See id. at 588-90.
56. See id. at 590.
57. See id. at 590-94.
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ordinance's reach; no landowner outside the specified area was
challenging the ordinance's economic impact, and the ordinance
did not make the enterprise, itself, lawful.5 8  "The question,
therefore, [was] simply whether one who may own or occupy
property in or adjacent to the prescribed limits.., can prevent
the enforcement.., on the ground that by it his rights under
the Federal Constitution are invaded." 9
After framing the question, the Court established the prece-
dent for the use of the police powers stating that:
Until there is some invasion of Congressional power or of pri-
vate rights secured by the Constitution of the United States,
the action of the States in this respect is beyond question in
the courts of the nation.... It is no part of the judicial func-
tion to determine the wisdom or folly of a regulation by the
legislative body in respect to matters of a police nature.,o
Without challenging the legislature's authority to address the
topic, the Court continued: "The truth is, that the exercise of the
police power often works pecuniary injury, but the settled rule of
this court is that the mere fact of pecuniary injury does not war-
rant the overthrow of legislation of a police character."6'
As for the landowners within the district from which the ac-
tivity was not precluded, the Court reasoned:
Who can say in advance that in proximity to their property
any houses of the character indicated will be established, or
that any persons of loose character will find near by [sic] a
home? They may go to the other end of the named district.
All that can be said is that by narrowing the limits within
which such houses and people must be, the greater the proba-
bility of their near location. Even if any such establishment
should be located in proximity, there is nothing in the ordi-
nance to deny the ordinary right of the individual to restrain
a private nuisance.62
58. See id. at 595-96.
59. Id. at 596.
60. Id. at 595-97.
61. Id. at 598.
62. Id. at 600.
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After citing Hyde and Mugler, the Court sustained the ordi-
nance.6
In Reinman v. City of Little Rock," the Court returned to
an enduring object of majoritarian consternation. In Reinman
the city prohibited the continued operation of a livery stable, a
preexisting use.65 The Court did not hesitate to embrace the
city's authority, concluding that "in particular circumstances
and in particular localities a livery stable [is] a nuisance in
fact and in law."66 Similarly, the Court in Northwestern Laun-
dry v. City of Des Moines" sustained a city ordinance which
prohibited dense smoke in areas of the city by declaring it "a
public nuisance."68
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.6" represented a more
methodical invocation of the police power. In that case, the vil-
lage zoning ordinance precluded businesses and apartment hous-
es from locating in designated portions of a residential area.7"
The Court turned to the law of nuisance to guide its facial anal-
ysis of the scheme,7' finding that a sufficient rational relation-
ship existed between the regulation's health and safety object
and its impact to sustain the police power exercise.72 Nectow v.
City of Cambridge7" presented an as-applied challenge to a resi-
dential zoning ordinance.74 The Court confirmed an earlier
finding that the after-enacted ordinance effectively deprived the
landowner of all "practical" uses and left "comparatively little
63. See id. at 598-600.
64. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
65. See id. at 172-73.
66. Id. at 176.
67. 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
68. Id. at 492-93, 495.
69. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
70. See id. at 379-80. The ordinance created six classes of use districts, three
classes of height districts, and four classes of area districts. See id. at 380. The use
districts were classified with respect to the types of buildings permitted within such
districts. See id.
71. See id. at 387-89.
72. See id. at 395 (citing Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,
530-31 (1917) and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905)).
73. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
74. See id. at 185.
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value."75 Balancing the benefit to the city against the burden on
expectancies led the Court to conclude that, this time, "the
health, safety, convenience and general welfare... will not be
promoted by the disposition made by the ordinance."76 In other
cases challenging zoning ordinance validity, the Court balanced
the competing interests and sustained zoning requirements for
reasonable setbacks from streets,7 7 height restrictions,78 and
geographical locations of businesses.79
2. 'Family Needs" as a Justification for Land-Use Regulations
These early police power decisions by the Court only hinted at
what would follow when the Court began invoking other consti-
tutional provisions. "A quiet place where yards are wide, people
few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a
land-use project addressed to family needs."8' The Court ut-
tered these words in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,1 address-
ing whether multiple college students could reside on property
zoned for family residences. 2 In that opinion, the Court re-
ferred both to Euclid, noting that "[t]he main thrust of th[at]
case.., was.., to keep residential areas free of 'disturbing
noises'; 'increased traffic'; the hazard of 'moving and parked
automobiles'; [while not] ... 'depriving children of the privilege
of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more fa-
vored localities'," and to Berman v. Parker, noting that "[i]t is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the com-
munity should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.""
Sustaining the ordinance at issue in Belle Terre, the Court
75. Id. at 187.
76. Id. at 188.
77. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927).
78. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1909).
79. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (holding valid in
part a state law that prohibited eyeglass frame retailers from occupying space in
which eye examinations were conducted).
80. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 2-3.
83. Id. at 5 (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926)).
84. Id. at 6 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)).
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concluded that the municipality's definition of family as no more
than two unrelated persons intruded on no fundamental right
and, as a result, needed only to bear a rational relationship to a
permissible state objective.' As for the permissible objective,
the Court reasoned that: "The police power is not confined to
elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the bless-
ings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people." 6 Acknowledging that "every line drawn by a legis-
lature leaves some out that might well have been included," the
Court nonetheless underscored that the "exercise of discre-
tion.., is a legislative, not a judicial, function."87
Twenty-one years later, the Court, in City of Edmonds v. Ox-
ford House, Inc.,' addressed still another local ordinance de-
signed to regulate family occupancy. In Oxford House, it did so in
the context of the Fair Housing Act's (FHA)89 prohibition of dis-
crimination against the handicapped. 0 Under the FHA, "dis-
crimination" included "a refusal to make reasonable accommoda-
tions in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accom-
modations [might] be necessary to afford [handicapped] person[s]
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling."91 The Oxford
House operated a group home for ten to twelve recovering alco-
holics and drug addicts.92 The home was in an area zoned for
single-family residences.93 The city of Edmonds invoked the or-
dinance and the ordinance's definition of family as the basis for
citing Oxford House for a zoning violation.94 The resulting litiga-
tion raised the question of whether the FHA limited the city's
85. See id. at 7-8.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
88. 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
90. See Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. at 1778.
91. Id. at 1779 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B)).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. The ordinance defined family as "persons [without regard to number]
related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of five or fewer [unrelated]
persons." Id. at 1778-79 (quoting Edmonds Community Development Code §
21.30.010 (1991)).
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discretion or whether, instead, the city's restriction was a statu-
torily permitted "maximum occupancy restriction" such as a cap
on the number of occupants per dwelling in view of available
floor space or the number or type of rooms.95 If viewed as the
latter, the ordinance fell within a statutory absolute exemption
to the FHA. 8 The Court distinguished maximum occupancy re-
strictions, viewing them as ordinarily applying uniformly to "all
residents of all dwelling units" and seeking to protect health and
safety by preventing overcrowding. 7 In contrast, family compo-
sition rules were more appropriately seen as land-use restrictions
to preserve the character of a neighborhood.98 Because other
provisions tied to floor area concerns existed in the city's code,
the Court concluded that the restrictions at issue were primarily
land-use related.99 As such, the ordinance was not exempt from
the FHA and the case was remanded for further proceedings to
determine whether a violation of the FHA existed. 100
3. "Quality of Life" as a Justification for Local Land-Use
Planning
Quality of life is another factor that the Court has weighed
when trying to balance property owners expectancies with
majoritarian community concerns. In Young v. American Mini
Theaters, Inc., °1 the majority's evolving concept of quality of
life was reflected in Detroit's efforts to address the neighborhood
impact of theaters showing sexually explicit adult movies.0 2
The city's ordinance, instead of concentrating adult theaters in
specific zones, scattered them throughout the city with restric-
tions limiting their proximity to specific regulated uses or resi-
dential areas.' Adult movie theater owners challenged the or-
dinances as impermissibly vague under the Fourteenth
95. See id.
96. See 42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
97. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. at 1781.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 1782-83.
100. See id. at 1783.
101. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
102. See id. at 52.
103. See id.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause, invalid under the First
Amendment as prior restraints on free speech, and violative of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
0 4
The Court had "no doubt that the municipality may control the
location of theaters as well as the location of other commercial es-
tablishments, either by confining them to certain specified com-
mercial zones or by requiring that they be dispersed throughout
the city."1°5 This scatter-zoning thrust, in the Court's view, im-
posed only a minimal burden on First Amendment expectan-
cies.0 6 The Court held that: "The mere fact that the commercial
exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is sub-
ject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient
reason for invalidating these ordinances."" 7 Although recogniz-
ing that "the First Amendment protects communication in this
area from total suppression," the Court held "that the State may
legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for
placing them in a different classification from other motion pic-
tures."' The Court found that the city's concern that concen-
trating the target theaters in a particular area tended to encour-
age crime and cause neighborhood deterioration was a legitimate
matter for the police power.'19
104. See id. at 58.
105. Id. at 62.
106. See id. at 62-63.
107. Id. at 62.
108. Id. at 70-71.
109. See id. at 71 n.34. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986), the Court sustained a Washington town's local ordinance prohibiting adult
motion picture theaters from locating within 1000 feet of any residential zone,
single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. See id. ht 43, 54-55. Fur-
ther, the Court held that so long as the evidence on which the city relied was rea-
sonably relevant to the problem addressed by the ordinance, the city did not need to
commission its own study when studies previously completed by other localities ex-
isted. See id. at 51; cf Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-11 (1972)
(recognizing the legitimate state interest in protecting the environment around
schools from disturbing noises).
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4. "Historical Value" as the Basis for Land-Use Controls
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,11 the
Court focused on the evolving majority concern over the preser-
vation of property with historical value or unique architectural
attributes."' Responding to that concern, New York City en-
acted a landmarks preservation law in 1965."' The City ar-
gued that the law would foster civic pride, encourage tourism,
stimulate business and industry, strengthen the City's economic
base, and promote the historic districts and landmarks."' The
Court summarized the ordinance's "special restrictions on land-
mark properties," as assuring landowners "a 'reasonable return'
on their investments and maximum latitude to use their parcels
for purposes not inconsistent with the preservation goals."""
Landmark designation under the ordinance triggered restric-
tions preserving, for example, exterior facades." 5 Procedures
were available both for an owner to obtain permission to alter
the landmark and for an owner to obtain a decision that the pro-
posed use was consistent with preservation concerns.16 To the
extent that the restrictions precluded development of full eco-
nomic potential otherwise available under the zoning laws, the
City's zoning structure provided for the TDRs to contiguous par-
cels in the same city block."' Subsequent ordinance amend-
ments liberalized the TDR provisions in order to enhance their
economic utility."'
Litigation arose over the landmark status assigned to Grand
Central Terminal ("Terminal") in New York City and the denial
of necessary approvals on the basis of landmark concerns for
construction of an office building over the Terminal."' The
110. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
111. See id. at 107-08.
112. See id. at 108-09.
113. See id. at 109.
114. Id. at 110.
115. See id. at 111-12 (citing N.Y.C. ADMiN. CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-10.0(a) (1976)).
116. See id. at 112 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8-A, §§ 207-5.0,-6.0,-8.0 (1976)).
117. See id. at 113-14. For a discussion of how TDRs can be used, see supra text
accompanying notes 7-16.
118. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 114-15.
119. See id. at 116-19.
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Court's opinion was twofold; the first message was directed at
the lawfulness of the ordinance and the second at its implica-
tions for compensation.' This Article focuses on the Court's
first message. 2' The Court dismissed the allegation that the
ordinance effected spot zoning.' The ordinance was compre-
hensive because it applied to all historic structures in the City
wherever found.1 3 Even though the ordinance applied only to
historic properties in the City, the Court did not view that ap-
proach as manifesting the kind of arbitrary and discriminatory
evil inherent in spot zoning. 24 Further, the Court accepted the
City's conclusion that preservation of landmarks benefitted all
New York citizens and structures "both economically and by im-
proving the quality of life in the city as a whole .... ."' On the
matter of preserving economic viability, the Court emphasized
that all use had not been denied, even all use of preexisting air
rights.' 5 Through TDRs, the rights were made "transferable to
at least eight parcels in the vicinity of the Terminal, one or two
of which have been found suitable for the construction of new
office buildings."'27
As a brief aside, consider for a moment what has become of
this historic preservation goal in the state courts. In United
Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,"28 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court entered its second opinion in a
case addressing the city's historic designation of a building's
interior in Philadelphia without the consent of the building's
owner. 2 ' The court quickly found that the statute included au-
thority to address historic preservation as a public purpose.
31
120. See id. at 122.
121. See id. at 131.
122. See id. at 132. "Spot zoning" occurs when a land-use decision "arbitrarily sin-
gles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighbor-
ing ones." Id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 134.
126. See id. at 135.
127. Id. at 137.
128. 635 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1993).
129. See id. at 614.
130. See id. at 616.
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It took solace in its conclusion that no jurisdiction had disagreed
with Penn Central3' and that both state and local policy sup-
ported governmental authority to address historic preserva-
tion.'32 The court ultimately concluded that the Philadelphia
Historical Commission ("Commission") had exceeded its authori-
ty in designating the building's interior as well.'33 Because the
court could not separate the exterior and interior designation
rationales in reviewing the Commission's order, it was "con-
strained to vacate the entire order."" Even so, the validity of
historical value zoning remains intact.
5. The Need for "Open Space" as a Basis for Land-Use
Regulations
In Agins v. City of Tiburon"'35 the Court addressed a West
Coast land-use planning technique, "the development of local
open-space plans [to] discourage the 'premature and unnecessary
conversion of open-space land to urban uses'."36 Responding to
that concern, Tiburon had adopted a zoning ordinance that
sought:
To avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to strict-
ly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant ad-
verse impacts, such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic
congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance of the
ecology and environment, hazards to geology, fire and flood,
and other demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl.'37
The city adopted this ordinance after Donald Agins and his wife
had purchased five acres of unimproved land within the Tiburon
131. See id. at 619.
132. See id. at 619-20.
133. See id. at 619-21.
134. Id. at 622.
135. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
136. Id. at 261 (quoting CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65561(b) (West 1983)). The state iden-
tified concern for "the continued availability of land for the production of food and
fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic beauty, for recreation and for the use of natural
resources," as the basis for the open-space plan. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65561(a).
137. Agins, 447 U.S. at 257, 261 n.8 (quoting Tiburon, Cal., Ordinance 124 N.S. § 1(c)
(June 28, 1973)).
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city limits.' 5 The two ordinances placed the five acre tract in a
"Residential Planned Development and Open Space Zone," re-
stricting the property to between one and five single family resi-
dences." 9 No indication existed that the ordinances applied on-
ly to the particular tracts.4 ' As a result, the Court held that
the Aginses would "share with other owners the benefits and
burdens of the city's exercise of its police power."' 4' The Court
also held that the ordinances benefitted both the Aginses and
the public "by serving the city's interest in assuring careful and
orderly development of residential property with provision for
open-space areas."'42
The Court, thus, has developed a strong tradition of sustaining
local government efforts to balance the challenges of growth with
the desire to define, establish, and maintain a community image
or quality of life. Even with this tradition of acceptance by the
Court, the local land-use zoning authority still must conform to
the fundamental constitutional quality of life contours. Belle
Terre, discussed above,.. stands in contrast to Moore v. City of
East Cleveland.'4 In Moore, the ordinance defined "family" in a
way that excluded certain relatives from living together.45 Jus-
tice Powell and three other Justices concluded that the result
intruded on liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and, joined by Justice Stevens,
relying on Euclid, the Court invalidated the ordinance. 46
6. First Amendment Restrictions on Local Land-Use Planning
Even though the police power provides communities with the
138. See id. at 257.
139. See id. Because the plaintiff in Agins failed to apply for development of this
property, the case actually may not have been ripe. See id. This defect, however, is
not relevant to this Article's focus on the Court's endorsement of the ordinance as
advancing legitimate state goals.
140. See id. at 262.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); see supra Part III.A.2.
144. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
145. See id. at 496 n.2.
146. See id. at 506, 520-21.
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right to make land-use decisions, other constitutional provisions,
including the First Amendment, also inform the legal frame-
work. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim47 offers a contrast
to Young, also discussed earlier.4" In Schad, the property own-
er was convicted of providing live, nude entertainment in the
Mount Ephraim commercial zone.'49 The New Jersey courts
concluded that the Mount Ephraim Code precluded 'live enter-
tainment" (including nude dancing) in any "establishment" in
the Borough. 5' The Supreme Court stated: "[b]y excluding live
entertainment throughout the Borough, the Mount Ephraim
ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression that has long
been held to be within the protections of the First and Four-
teenth Amendments."'51 Further, the Court noted that al-
though "[tihe power of local governments to zone and control
land use [is] broad and its proper exercise ... an essential as-
pect of achieving a satisfactory quality of life in both urban and
rural communities, [it is] not infinite and unchallengeable."'5 2
The Court harkened back to Moore, underscoring that the
power "must be exercised within constitutional limits." ' The
Court articulated the following standard: "[Wihen a zoning law
infringes upon a protected liberty [First Amendment speech], it
must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently sub-
stantial government interest.""5 ' The Court distinguished the
"minimal burden" context of the scatter zoning in Young from
the preclusive impact of the ordinance now before it.'55 Al-
though some forms of live entertainment might create parking
problems or demands on police and other city facilities, the Bor-
ough failed to meet its burden that no less intrusive means than
the overinclusive restriction on protected speech existed.'56 The
147. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
148. 427 U.S. 50 (1976); see supra Part III.A.3.
149. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 62-64.
150. See id. at 64-65.
151. Id. at 65.
152. Id. at 68.
153. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 514 (1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring)).
154. Id.
155. See id. at 71-72.
156. See id. at 73-74. The Borough also failed to demonstrate that live enter-
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Court remarked that "this ordinance is not narrowly drawn to
respond to what might be the distinctive problems arising from
certain types of live entertainment, and it is not clear that a
more selective approach would fail to address those unique prob-
lems if any there are." 5' The ordinance also failed to fall with-
in an exception as a reasonable "time, place, and manner" re-
striction on protected speech. 5 ' The Court stated that, "[t]o be
reasonable, time, place and manner restrictions not only must
serve significant state interests but also must leave open ade-
quate alternative channels of communication."'59
Another area of land-use contention that implicates the First
Amendment is the location of billboards. 6 ' In Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego,'6' the city promulgated an ordinance im-
posing serious restrictions on outdoor advertising within the
city. '6 Although a business could post on-site signs, the ordi-
nance prohibited other commercial and noncommercial advertis-
ing unless it fell within one of twelve exceptions." Exceptions
included: government signs, signs at bus stops, signs stored in
the city, signs within shopping malls, temporary political cam-
paign signs, and so on." At the time the ordinance was
passed, Metromedia owned signs throughout the city having re-
maining useful lives of over twenty-five years and fair market
values ranging between $2500 and $25,000.' The city relied
on concerns regarding pedestrian safety and motorist distrac-
tion, a public health and safety basis, to justify its decision."
In effect, the ordinance allowed an owner to advertise his own
tainment was incompatible with all presently permitted uses in the Borough so the
Court did not address whether the Borough could have excluded "all commercial us-
es within its boundaries." Id. at 75.
157. Id. at 74.
158. See id. at 74-76.
159. Id. at 75-76.
160. The Court has a long history of involvement in this area. See, e.g., Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); St. Louis Poster Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis,
249 U.S. 269 (1919); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917).
161. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
162. See id. at 493.
163. See id. at 494.
164. See id. at 494-95.
165. See id. at 496.
166. See id. at 493.
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goods or services but not those of others. In addition, it prohibit-
ed the display of most noncommercial messages through bill-
boards.167 Metromedia challenged the prohibition of commer-
cial and noncommercial speech under the First Amendment.'
The Court "continue[d] to observe the distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech, indicating that the for-
mer could be forbidden and regulated in situations where the
latter could not be."'69 It found that the city's ordinance met the
four-part test enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission.. for commercial speech. The
Court held that the ordinance did not violate the First
Amendment for several reasons. First, the First Amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech applied because the speech con-
cerned a lawful activity and was not misleading. Second, the
restriction sought to implement a substantial governmental in-
terest. Third, the restriction directly advanced that interest. Fi-
nally, the restriction was narrowly tailored. 7' The Court's key
inquiry was whether the ordinance directly advanced a substan-
tial government interest.' The Court had no difficulty accept-
ing the rationale that billboards could be traffic hazards or that
aesthetic concerns were a legitimate purpose of the restric-
tion.' Moreover, the Court determined that the distinction be-
tween off-site and on-site commercial advertising was reasonable;
the commercial enterprise had a particularly significant interest
at the location where it provided its products or services.'74
The regulation of noncommercial speech to promote quality of
life was viewed less favorably by the Court. The Court concluded
that "[w]ith respect to noncommercial speech, the city may not
choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse." 175
"To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for
167. See id. at 495-96.
168. See id. at 497-98.
169. Id. at 506.
170. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
171. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66).
172. See id. at 508.
173. See id. at 507-08.
174. See id. at 508.
175. Id. at 515.
1997] 1069
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1047
public debate would be to allow that government control over
the search for political truth." Because some noncommercial
messages may be conveyed on billboards throughout the com-
mercial and industrial zones, San Diego must similarly allow
billboards conveying other noncommercial messages through-
out those zones. 78
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause also implicates
land-use planning issues. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,'"
the Holy Cross Armenian Catholic Parish was located only ten
feet from the back wall of an adjacent restaurant.178 In 1977,
the restaurant applied for an alcoholic beverage license.'79 In-
voking a state statute that authorized churches or schools with-
in 500 feet of a location to object to, and effectively veto, issu-
ance of the license, 8 ° the Parish objected to the restaurant's
application. 8' The restaurant challenged the state's denial of
the license, which rested solely on the Parish's objection.'82 The
State defended the statute and the action as a "zoning" law, di-
rected at shielding churches and schools from liquor establish-
ments and at "protect[ing] diverse centers of spiritual, educa-
tional, and cultural enrichment."" The Court responded
warmly to the valid interest of insulating churches and schools
from certain commercial enterprises, including those that sell
liquor, and to the power of the state to "regulate the environ-
ment in the vicinity of schools, churches, [and] hospitals.""8
Consistent with its prior land-use decisions, the Court spoke
of the zoning function as a balancing of competing consider-
ations that should not be overturned on review, absent a show-
ing of arbitrariness or irrationality."8 It even bolstered that
176. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 447 U.S. 530,
538 (1980)).
177. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
178. See id. at 117.
179. See id.
180. See MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 138, § 16C (West 1991).
181. See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 118.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 120.
184. Id. at 121.
185. See id.
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observation by noting the enhanced role of the state in alcohol
regulation under the Twenty-First Amendment.1" In this state
statute, however, it saw something quite different. The Court
held that the Massachusetts courts interpreted the statute au-
thorizing the church's action as conferring a power to veto liquor
license applications.8 7 In this context, the deference normally
accorded zoning determinations was not warranted." Pointing
out that "the core rationale underlying the Establishment
Clause [was] preventing 'a fusion of governmental and religious
functions'," 9 the Court concluded that:
The Framers did not set up a system of government in
which important, discretionary governmental powers would
be delegated to or shared with religious institutions....
The challenged statute thus enmeshes churches in the pro-
cesses of government and creates the danger of "[plolitical
fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines." Ordinary
human experience and a long line of cases teach that few
entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of theConstitution."®
Thus, the constitutional requirements of the Establishment
Clause trumped the state's ability to regulate land use in this
circumstance.
7. Fourteenth Amendment Constraints on Land-Use
Regulation
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,19 ' the land-
use planning power of the state conflicted with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 92 The city deter-
mined that the applicant's proposal to house thirteen retarded
men and women under constant supervision in a house with
186. See id. at 121-22.
187. See id. at 122.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 126 (quoting Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
190. Id. at 127 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971)).
191. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
192. See id. at 435.
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four bedrooms and two baths constituted a "hospital for the
feeble minded." 9' As such, the proposed use did not fall within
the permitted uses for the particular zone without issuance of a
special use permit." The city denied the permit.9 ' The
Court concluded that the legislative determination based on
mental retardation did not trigger "a quasi-suspect classification
calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is
normally accorded economic and social legislation,"'96 but that
"legislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded
and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmen-
tal purpose."9 7
Because other care and multiple-dwelling facilities were al-
lowed in the area without requiring a special permit, the Court
invalidated the city's rejection of a special use permit.'9' Ex-
plaining why, the Court stated: "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a home
for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, and the like."' The Court dismissed all of
the city's arguments. First, a nearby school's student population
included mentally challenged students, so the location of the fa-
cility hardly could be objectionable. 00 Second, because hospi-
tals and other similar structures were situated in the same area,
the city's argument that the facility would be located on a flood
plain also failed rationality review."' Third, restrictions based
on the number of individuals occupying a boarding house would
not apply and, as a result, it was not justified to invoke restric-
tions of that kind against the mentally challenged."2
The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case ap-
193. Id. at 435-37.
194. See id. at 436.
195. See id. at 437.
196. Id. at 442.
197. Id. at 446.
198. See id. at 447-48.
199. Id. at 448.
200. See id. at 449.
201. See id.
202. See id.
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pears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded, including those who would occupy the
Featherstone facility and who would live under the closely
supervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provid-
ed for by state and federal law."ce
Even though the Court rejected the city's action in Cleburne,
it is important to note that the majority may in fact reserve
land-use decisionmaking to itself, placing the instruments of
governance at least somewhat to the side. A zoning ordinance
may be submitted to referendum review by the public.'" In
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,205 the role of
the referendum in zoning also made its way to the Supreme
Court. In Eastlake, a real estate developer acquired a parcel
zoned for "light industrial" use and then, in 1971, sought a re-
zoning to permit construction of a multi-family, high-rise apart-
ment building."'6 Before the City Council approved the Plan-
ning Commission's recommendation for rezoning, the voters
amended the town charter to require that any changes in land
use be submitted to referendum and receive a favorable fifty-five
percent vote.0 7 When the developer subsequently applied for
an additional "paring and yard" approval, the application was
rejected because the initial rezoning approval had not been sub-
mitted to referendum.2 8 While litigation was pending, the ref-
erendum occurred but failed to muster the fifty-five percent
favorable action.20 9
The Court rejected the argument that the referendum require-
ment was an unconstitutional delegation of power. 0 To the
contrary, "[a] referendum cannot.., be characterized as a dele-
gation of power. Under our constitutional assumptions, all power
203. Id. at 450.
204. See, e.g., R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Committee for the Repeal of Ord. R(C)-88-
13, 391 S.E.2d 587, 587 (Va. 1990).
205. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
206. See id. at 670.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 671.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 672-75.
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derives from the people, who can delegate it to representative
instruments which they create."' Although the landowner
might have raised a challenge, even to the result of the referen-
dum zoning, it failed to do so.212 The "direct teaching" of Euclid
is that "a property owner can challenge a zoning restriction if
the measure is 'clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare'."213 The landowner might, under this standard,
have challenged the referendum result as unreasonable, clearly
"arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to the police pow-
er."214 If found wanting, the referendum result would have
failed." 5 Subject ultimately to the standards of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the availability of that remedy under state law was
all that the Constitution required.21 In contrast, the "absence
of standards" due process challenge actually pursued by the
landowner failed.2 7 This was not an instance of a
"standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property
owners" but an exercise of the fundamental decision-making
power reserved by the Ohio Constitution to the people.1 8
The cases in this section have highlighted the judiciary's role
in land-use planning as well as the judiciary's sensitivity when
establishing the constitutional contours of property expectancies.
This sensitivity can be seen throughout the cases discussed
above in the careful balancing of interests engaged in by the
judiciary. In the main, the' courts have proceeded very
thoughtfully. In the next section, this Article analyzes land-use
planning at the local level.
B. Designing Local Land-Use Structures
With the Court having shaped the constitutional contours,
this Article next looks at state courts and the backdrop of local
211. Id. at 672 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
212. See id. at 676.
213. Id. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 677.
217. See id. at 675.
218. See id. at 678.
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zoning structures against which they operate. In general, zoning
authorities classify land uses, for instance, residential (single
family or multifamily), commercial, and industrial uses.219
"Compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are exclud-
ed."220 In addition, as exemplified by the New York Zoning
Code of 1916,221 this method of classification of permissible
land uses both prefers residential development and allows for
compatible uses in other areas. To explain, the New York Build-
ing Zone Resolution divided New York City into three types of
districts, depending on use, height, and land area.222 As a gen-
eral rule, early use restrictions also ranged from more restrictive
to less restrictive.' That meant that although only residential
uses were permitted in residential zones, commercial zones
could include residential uses, and industrial zones could include
commercial and residential uses.2" Thus residential use was
the most protected target of the zoning.'
As a proud citizen of the Commonwealth of Virginia, albeit by
adoption, I cannot help but reference my state's zoning struc-
ture. In general, in Virginia "zoning" refers to the legislative
classification of land within a given jurisdiction into areas or
"zones" of use. 6 In each zoned area, the jurisdiction will regu-
late "building and structure designs, building and structure
placement and uses to which land, buildings and structures...
219. See 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN-
NING § 8.01[1] (4th ed. 1996).
220. MANDELKER, supra note 13, § 4.16.
221. 1916 N.Y. Laws 497.
222. See 6 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §
79C.01 (1996).
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. As the passage of time would make apparent, market economics would play a
profound role in how the public chose among the residential, commercial, and indus-
trial districts. The 1909 Los Angeles zoning structure contemplated multiple zones
and coupled that concept with exclusivity of use within the zones. In theory, concen-
tration of like uses in a given zone minimized the costs of public services in those
areas-allowing some standardization. See generally Martha A. Lees, Preserving Prop-
erty Values? Preserving Proper Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate
over Zoning for Exclusively Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT L. REv.
367, 371-72 (1994) (discussing the 1909 Los Angeles zoning ordinance).
226. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(k) (Michie Supp. 1996).
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may be put."227 "Incentive zoning" authorizes the jurisdiction to
enhance density or other benefits-beyond the level usually pro-
vided by the ordinance-in order to encourage developers to pro-
vide additional "features or amenities desired by the locality
within the development. " " "Special exception[s]" address uses
that are not allowable in a particular zone "except by a special
use permit."229 Conditional zoning also may be employed."s
Conditional zoning allows the jurisdiction to impose additional
or modified use requirements for particular areas beyond those
required by the applicable zoning ordinance.sl This Article re-
turns later to a particularly innovative concept of conditional
zoning in Virginia."s This section begins with the Virginia ju-
dicial review of the purpose and the role of state authorized zon-
ing."' In Cole v. City Council,' the Virginia Supreme Court
described zoning policy as designed to ensure a reasonable pre-
dictability of permissible land uses and a comfort that permitted
uses would not be subject to sudden or arbitrary change.ss
Next, this section details the state legislative perspective. In
sketching the Commonwealth's view of "quality of life," the Vir-
ginia zoning statute requires zoning officials to give due consid-
eration to concerns of public health, safety, convenience, and
welfare in designing and promulgating zoning ordinances."
227. Id.
228. Id. § 15.1-430(t).
229. Id. § 15.1-430(i).
230. See id. § 15.1-430(q).
231. See id.
232. See infra notes 299-313 and accompanying text.
233. The authority to zone in the Virginia Code provides for delegations to local
officials, see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-427.1 (Michie 1989), but local city charters are
subject to the delegation limitations of the state's zoning ordinance statute related to
rezoning. See, e.g., Laird v. City of Danville, 302 S.E.2d 21, 24 (Va. 1983) ("ITIhe re-
zoning of property, no less than the establishment of its original zoning classifica-
tion, is wholly legislative, requiring action in the form of an amendatory ordinance
adopted by the one 'purely legislative body' that exists in the locality involved."). Au-
thorized officials may look to the state statutory structure and their local ordinances
for sufficient standards to guide their discretion in making land-use decisions. See
Byrum v. Board of Supervisors, 225 S.E.2d 369, 373 (Va. 1976) (allowing the Board
the opportunity to permit or deny conditional use permits).
234. 241 S.E.2d 765 (Va. 1978).
235. See id. at 770.
236. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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Among the listed concerns are: adequate light and air; conve-
nience of access; safety from fire, flood, and other dangers; po-
tential traffic congestion; protection against overcrowding of land
and undue population density; encouragement of economic devel-
opment and tax base; preservation of agricultural and forest
lands; and provision of adequate police and fire protection.17
The Virginia zoning statute defines "development" as "a
tract of land developed or to be developed.., under single own-
ership or unified control for any business or industrial purpose
or... [which will] contain three or more residential dwell-
ing[s]."" It does not include property "principally devoted to
agricultural production.""9 A "mixed use development" is one
that includes "two or more different uses, and may include a
variety of housing types within a single development."4 A
"planned unit development" (PUD) contemplates a "unified site
design for a variety of housing types and densities, clustering of
buildings, common open space, and a mix of building types and
land uses.""' In a PUD, project planning and density calcula-
tions apply to the entire development rather than to the individ-
ual lot.242
Under the statute, "subdivision," unless otherwise defined by
a local ordinance, includes "the division of a parcel of land into
three or more lots or parcels of less than five acres each for the
purpose of transfer of ownership or building development."243
When a new street is involved in the division, the term encom-
passes any division of a parcel of land.2' For "recordation of
any single division of land into two lots or parcels, a plat of such
division [must] be submitted for approval" under Virginia Code
section 15.1-475.245 The "site plan" is the "proposal for [the] de-
velopment or a subdivision."246 The plan includes "all cove-
237. See id.
238. Id. § 15.1-430(m).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 15.1-430(r).
241. Id. § 15.1-430(s).
242. See id.
243. Id. § 15.1-430(l).
244. See id.
245. Id.; see also id. § 15.1-430(n) (defining "plat of subdivision").
246. Id. § 15.1-430(o).
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nants, grants or easements and other conditions relating to use,
location and bulk of buildings, density of development, common
open space, public facilities and such other information as re-
quired by the subdivision ordinance to which the proposed devel-
opment or subdivision is subject." 7
Virginia's structure includes internal doctrines suggesting lim-
its on invocation of the land-use police power in the service of
land-use controls." 8 For instance, when the zoning ordinance
solely advances private interests and not the public welfare, it is
deemed illegal "spot zoning."24 s Factors may include a compari-
son of previous zoning to the challenged zoning, relative benefits
and burdens of the rezoning from the perspective of the commu-
nity and the individual, and the symmetry between the chal-
lenged zoning and local land-use objectivesY
Virginia's system also recognizes the "variance,""m a residual
fine-tuning device to which this Article returns later. 2 Under
the Virginia statute, the jurisdiction may afford a "reasonable
deviation" from the zoning ordinance's provisions for size, area,
or location requirements. 3 The statutory language defines a
"variance" as appropriate when "strict application" of the zoning
ordinance results in "unnecessary or unreasonable hardship to
the property owner," when the "need for a variance [is] not...
shared generally by other properties," when the requested vari-
247. Id.
248. See infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 122 defining "spot zoning"; see also Board of Supervisors v.
Fralin & Waldron, Inc., 278 S.E.2d 859, 864 (Va. 1981) (holding that rezoning from
single-family to apartment dwellings was not illegal spot zoning when the issue was
fully considered by the Board, the area had little development at the time of rezon-
ing, and the Board reasonably could have concluded that introduction of apartments
was in the public interest); cf Resource Conservation Mgmt., Inc. v. Board of Super-
visors, 380 S.E.2d 879, 881 n.2 (Va. 1989) ("Under Dillon's Rule, effective in Virgin-
ia, 'the powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by statute and are limited to those
conferred expressly or by necessary implication'.") (quoting Board of Supervisors v.
Home, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455 (Va. 1975)). So viewed, Virginia Code section 15.1-486
conferred authority "to prohibit a specific use of land. While the language d[idJ not
specify a landfill as one of the uses that [could] be prohibited, such specificity [wals
not necessary even under the Dillon Rule of strict construction." Id. at 882.
250. See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 222, § 79C.03[3].
251. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(p) (Michie Supp. 1996).
252. See infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text.
253. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(p).
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ance does not run afoul of the "intended spirit and purpose of
the ordinance," and when "substantial justice" will be done.'
A "variance" does not address circumstances of "change in
use." 5 Those circumstances require "rezoning" or "conditional
zoning." "
IV. THE LOCAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN: DEFINING CONSENSUS
AND SELF-IMAGE AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL
Again using Virginia's statute as a touchstone, this Article
notes that Virginia Code section 15.1-446.1, for example, re-
quires the local zoning commission to "prepare and recommend a
comprehensive plan for the physical development of the territory
within its jurisdiction."25 ' To that end, the commission is to
"make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of the
existing conditions and trends of growth, and of the probable
future requirements of its territory and inhabitants." 8 In pre-
paring a comprehensive plan, the commission "shall survey and
study" the use of the land, preservation of agricultural and for-
ested lands, trends of growth or change, probable future econom-
ic growth and population growth, and other factors. 9 In short,
the comprehensive plan is the community's description of its
self-image-its plans for population growth, commercial and eco-
nomic stability, and improved quality of life."6 In Virginia, the
plan's purpose is to "guid[e] and accomplish[ I a coordinated, ad-
justed and harmonious development of the territory which will,
in accordance with present and probable future needs and re-
sources best promote the health, safety, morals, order, conve-
nience, prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants.""1
More broadly, it serves the important purpose of guarding
against "arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable exercise[s] of
the.., police power," such as "spot zoning," by rationalizing the
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. § 15.1-446.1.
258. Id.
259. See id. § 15.1-446.1, 15.1-447(A)(1).
260. See id. § 15.1446.1.
261. Id.
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exercise of authority.262
The comprehensive plan "may include but need not be limited
to": (1) the designation of areas for public and private develop-
ment and use such as "residential, business, industrial, agricul-
tural, mineral resources, conservation, recreation, public service,
flood plain and drainage, and other areas";2  (2) the designa-
tion of a system of transportation facilities ranging from streets
and roads to airports;2  (3) the designation of a system of com-
munity service facilities such as "parks, forests, schools, play-
grounds, public buildings and institutions, hospitals, community
centers, waterworks, sewage disposal or waste disposal areas
and the like";21 (4) the designation of areas warranting special
treatment, such as historical or urban renewal areas;20 (5) at-
tention to groundwater protection concerns; 21 (6) "an official
map, [as well as] a capital improvements program, a subdivision
ordinance, a zoning ordinance and zoning district maps...
where applicable"; 268 and (7) the designation of areas for mea-
sures to provide affordable housing.269 In Virginia, apparently,
the plan is a guideline and is not, itself, a mandatory land-use
ordinance. 7 ' The preparation of the plan, however, is man-
datory and it must be renewed every five years.27'
The subdivision ordinance, or component of the comprehensive
plan, must provide for plat details sufficient for recordation un-
der applicable Virginia law, for coordination of streets within
262. POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 222, § 79C.021].
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-446.1(1) (Michie Supp. 1996).
264. See id. § 15.1-446.1(2).
265. Id. § 15.1-446.1(3).
266. See id. § 15.1-446.1(4).
267. See id. § 15.1-446.1(5).
268. Id. § 15.1-446.1(6).
269. See id. § 15.1-446.1(7).
270. See Board of Supervisors v. Safeco Ins. Co., 310 S.E.2d 445, 448 (Va. 1983);
Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 202 S.E.2d 889, 894 (Va. 1974). The
statute reads: "Whenever the local commission shall have recommended a compre-
hensive plan or part thereof for the county or municipality and such plan shall have
been approved and adopted by the governing body, it shall control the general or
approximate location, character and extent of each feature shown on the plan." VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-456(A). The apparent exception to "guidance" status is for streets,
parks, and other public facilities as to which the plan's provisions are mandatory.
See id.
271. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-454 (Michie 1989).
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and contiguous to the subdivision, for drainage and flood control,
for street grading and graveling, and for the dedication for pub-
lic use of rights of ways such as gutters, streets, and bicycle
trails.2  Plats of proposed subdivisions and site plans must be
submitted for approval and the ordinance may require prelimi-
nary submissions, with accompanying timelines for administra-
tive action.7 3 Once approved, a subdivision plat will be valid
for not less than five years or such longer period as the local au-
thority concludes appropriate. 4 Notably, "[a] site plan shall be
deemed final once it has been reviewed and approved by the lo-
cality if the only requirement remaining to be satisfied in order
to obtain a building permit is the posting of any bonds and es-
crows."25 Finally, the subdivision ordinance itself may include
a provision for a variance or exception to the general regulations
"in cases of unusual situations or when strict adherence to the
general regulations would result in substantial injustice or hard-
ship." 6 These statutory regulations establishing a zoning
scheme are only the basic elements of local day-to-day land-use
planning. Local planners have a variety of other tools that they
can use to balance competing interests and to foster
accommodation.
272. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(A) (Michie Supp. 1996).
273. See id. § 15.1-475(A)-(C).
274. See id. § 15.1-475(D).
275. Id. The statute continues:
For so long as the final site plan remains valid in accordance with the
provisions of this section, or in the case of a recorded plat for five years
after approval, no change or amendment to any local ordinance, map,
resolution, rule, regulation, policy or plan adopted subsequent to the date
of approval of the recorded plat or final site plan shall adversely affect
the right of the subdivider or developer or his successor in interest to
commence and complete an approved development in accordance with the
lawful terms of the recorded plat or site plan unless the change or
amendment is required to comply with state law or there has been a
mistake, fraud or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the
public health, safety or welfare.
Id. § 15.1-475(F).
276. Id. § 15.1-466(B).
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V. TOOLS OF LOCAL ACCOMMODATION:
COMMUNITY GoALs AND EXPECTANCY
By the time state legislation authorizes translating the
majority's concern over local land use into actual regulation, a
comprehensive plan is drawn helping to crystallize the local
majority's concerns, land-use ordinances are developed at the
local level, and those ordinances are brought to bear on proposed
land uses through subdivision proposals, site plans, building
permits, and so on, the regulated landowners have had several
opportunities to participate in the design of the land-use regula-
tory system. Still, the system has recognized the advantage of
encouraging use compatible with the defined community goals,
even after the plan has been formulated. The regulatory system
has developed many tools to allow "fine-tuning" of the plan and
to accommodate development within the community's compre-
hensive plan. These tools of accommodation are discussed below.
A. Nonconforming Uses
The local zoning structure may simply exempt those uses ex-
isting at its effective date.277 The nonconforming use concept
addresses those uses already existing at the time of a change in
zoning classification.27 Virginia's zoning structure provides ex-
pressly that it will not be construed to impair vested rights, but
it does authorize zoning ordinances to address nonconforming
structures "so long as*the then existing or a more restricted use
continues and such use is not discontinued for more than two
years ... ."'79 To remain within this protection, a changing use
must have sufficient connection to the use existing at the time of
the ordinance.28 ° Changes in the character of use may, for ex-
277. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492 (Michie 1989).
278. See, e.g., id.
279. Id.
280. See Masterson v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 353 S.E.2d 727, 734-35 (Va. 1987)
(stating that under the local ordinance, current zoning was residential and accessory
commercial parking was not permitted in the residential district; accordingly, the
court held that the parking lot owner had to establish that its nonconforming use
was lawful "by prov[ing that its [commercial] use began before the residential zon-
ing restriction applied").
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ample, be measured by the quantity of the increase in use and
its effects on the underlying policies of the zoning ordinance.2"'
In Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville,"2
the plaintiff purchased a quarry in 1987.' The quarry had
been declared a nonconforming use in 1963 and at that time the
previous owner had agreed t6 a mining depth limitation. ' The
plaintiff initially mined under two temporary certificates of oc-
cupancy; the second certificate, however, was suspended when
Borough engineers discovered asbestos material at the site."5
In 1988, the plaintiff filed for an application to mine and exca-
vate down to levels below the earlier stipulated floor.' The
Borough denied the application. 7 The court concluded that
the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation at the time of its ac-
quisition to quarry 10,000,000 metric tons "without being subject
to significant governmental restrictions.""s Under local law,
"[allthough a nonconforming use protect[ed] a property owner
against subsequent zoning restrictions, it clearly [did] not pre-
vent a municipality from regulating the land, pursuant to its po-
lice power, in the public interest." 9
B. Amortization
Amortization is another mechanism for adjusting the final fit
between local land-use policy goals and the individual proposed
use.2" This technique is frequently seen in the context of regu-
281. See Knowlton v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 260 S.E.2d 232, 237 (Va. 1979) ("Rec-
ognizing that a nonconforming use need not remain static, we consider whether the
character of the nonconforming use in existence when the zoning restriction was im-
posed has been continued or changed."). In this case the change was from a small,
four truck trucking enterprise hauling random cargoes to a trash collection and dis-
position business. See id.
282. 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992).
283. See id. at 1378.
284. See id. at 1379.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. Id. "It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the use of his
property to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by
the State in legitimate exercise of its police power." Id. (quoting Lucas v. South Car-
olina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992)).
289. Id. at 1385.
290. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adver. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1077
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lating roadside billboards.291 For example, Naegele Outdoor Ad-
vertising v. City of Durham292 involved an ordinance by the city
that regulated billboard style.29 It prohibited all commercial,
off-premise advertising signs after completion of a five and one-
half year amortization period." 4 The district court opinion,
adopted by the circuit court of appeals without opinion,295 rec-
ognized that amortization periods have been included in zoning
ordinances to avoid eminent domain proceedings and to provide
an alternative to forbidding nonconforming uses.296 "For an
amortization period to be reasonable it must give the property
owner a reasonable opportunity to recoup or minimize the loss of
use of his property by the end of the amortization period."'
Naegele recovered substantially more than its investment and,
indeed, benefitted during the years in which the litigation was
pending. 9 '
C. Conditional Zoning and Open Space
Conditional zoning is a key local tool in accommodating
changing land-use goals and expectancies. Under Virginia's
structure, conditional zoning allows additional or modified use
requirements beyond those of the overall zoning ordinance for
particular zoning districts.2" Some intriguing flexibilities exist.
(M.D.N.C. 1992), affd, 19 F.3d 11 (4th Cir. 1994).
291. See, e.g., id.
292. Id.
293. See id. at 1070.
294. See id.
295. See Naegele, 19 F.3d at 11.
296. See Naegele, 803 F. Supp. at 1077.
297. Id. "Reasonableness" factors listed by the court included:
the initial cost of, or investment in, the signs, the degree to which the
signs have been fully depreciated, the remaining useful life, the replace-
ment cost and salvage value of the signs, the alternative uses for the
signs, the loss of revenue as a result of the ordinance, and the percent-
age of signs affected.
Id. at 1077-78.
298. Naegele received $1,707,559.18 from the disputed signs during the amor-
tization period. Naegele has benefitted from income it earned from the
disputed signs for the additional years while this litigation has been
pending. The revenue Naegele earned from the disputed signs .... far
outweigh[ed its costs].
Id. at 1078.
299. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(q) (Michie Supp. 1996); see also iUL § 15.1-
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For instance, in the context of a rezoning or an amendment to a
zoning map, the ordinance may apparently provide for "the vol-
untary proffering in writing, by the owner, of reasonable condi-
tions" relating to the rezoning, but not including cash payments
to the county or the municipality or mandatory dedications."'
If the proffered conditions nonetheless include a dedication of
real property of substantial value or construction of substantial
public improvement "the need for which is not generated solely
by the rezoning," the resulting zoning receives a status protected
against change.30 '
An especially intriguing flexibility exists for communities ex-
periencing ten percent or more growth in population since 1980
and for their adjacent communities.0 2 In those jurisdictions,
ordinances may provide that, in the context of a rezoning or
amendment to a zoning map, developers can propose or volun-
tarily proffer "conditions" having a reasonable relationship to
the proposed rezoning."3 The "proffered" conditions must be
attributable to the rezoning itself, must have a reasonable rela-
tionship to the rezoning, and must be in conformity with the
comprehensive plan.0 4 In these jurisdictions, the proffers may
include not only the dedication of property but also the contribu-
491(a) (authorizing local ordinances to include provisions for variances (as defined in
§ 15.1-4 30(p)) or special exceptions (as defined in § 15.1-430(i)), "in cases of unusual
situations or to ease the transition from one district to another, or for buildings,
structures or uses having special requirements," and for conditional zoning (as de-
fined in § 15.1-430(q)); id. § 15.1-491.2(A) (stating that conditions must be consistent
with the local comprehensive plan and related to physical site development).
300. Id. § 15.1-491.2(A).
301. Id. § 15.1-491.2(B).
[N]o amendment to the zoning map for the property subject to such con-
ditions, nor the conditions themselves, nor any amendments to the text
of the zoning ordinance with respect to the zoning district applicable
thereto initiated by the governing body, which eliminate, or materially
restrict, reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or the density of
use permitted . . . shall be effective . . .unless there has been mistake,
fraud, or a change in circumstances substantially affecting the public
health, safety, or welfare.
Id.
302. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1(A).
303. See id.
304. See id.
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tion of cash."0 5 If accepted by the jurisdiction as amendments
to the zoning ordinance, the conditions generally continue until
subsequent amendment." 6 They may be effective even longer if
the subsequent amendment becomes part of a "comprehensive
implementation of a new or substantially revised zoning ordi-
nance."0 7 If the condition includes a dedication of real property
of substantial value, or substantial cash payments for (or con-
struction of) public improvements beyond the needs of the rezon-
ing itself:
Then no amendment to the zoning map for the property sub-
ject to such conditions, nor the conditions themselves, nor
any amendments to the text of the zoning ordinance with
respect to the zoning district applicable thereto initiated by
the governing body, which eliminate, or materially restrict,
reduce, or modify the uses, the floor area ratio, or the density
of use permitted in the zoning district applicable to such
property, shall be effective with respect to such property un-
less there has been mistake, fraud, or a change in circum-
stances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or
welfare." s
This proffer system seems well-suited to a broad spectrum of
community goals and land-use expectancies, including open
space and environmental protection. Developers agree to certain
restrictions, such as an open space requirement, and in turn if
their proffer is deemed substantial enough, receive protection
against zoning changes for a number of years. Thus, both sides
benefit.
Traditional zoning separated uses and regulated densities and
setbacks.0 9 Once classified, the spaces were usually developed.
Even if space was left at that time, today's redevelopment will
frequently consume the maximum capacity of the tract and effec-
tively consume all free space. In the end, traditional zoning faces
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. Id.
308. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1(B).
309. See generally MANDELKER, supra note 13, §§ 5.01 to 5.74 (describing zoning for
land use, density, and site development in the United States).
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great difficulty in protecting open spaces. Preserving open space,
of course, also constitutes the most significant challenge to land-
owner expectancy.
In new developments, conditional zoning offers a particularly
potent tool for bridging that gap.' For instance, a portion of a
tract may be developed to a higher than otherwise applicable
density on the condition that the remainder of the tract will be
committed to open space."' In this way, the landowner's devel-
opment potential in the property is preserved."1 2 In addition,
infrastructure and its costs are concentrated in the developed
segment."3 This approach serves to reduce both the costs of
development and the costs of public services. The enhancement
that the open space brings to the smaller "cluster" development
lots stands a good chance of also increasing the development's
overall value. Cluster open space planning can be triggered in
zoning districts where public policy favors preserving certain
environmentally sensitive propprties, where development may
exceed a set proportion of the development potential for a tract,
and where large lots are planned for development.
The dynamic that exists among conditional zoning, open space
protection, and landowner expectancy appears in the case law as
well. In a California case, Ramona Convent of the Holy Names v.
City of Alhambra, 4 the city declined to sponsor the Convent's
proposed project for a 1.97 acre parcel, reasoning that the parcel
"would have been too small to be conducive to any of the uses
permitted for open space." 15 Without that sponsorship, the
310. Some jurisdictions are even more assertive, requiring open space. See, e.g.,
River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 388 S.E.2d 538, 540 (N.C. 1990) (involving a
city ordinance requiring 10% of the area of a townhouse development be reserved as
open space).
311. See, e.g., id. at 549-50.
312. See, e.g., id. at 550.
313. In that sense, conditional open space zoning addresses .the same concern as
TDRs. TDRs, however, also face the additional complication of the need for tracts
that can benefit from the TDR, once transferred. See supra text accompanying note
8. In conditional open space zoning, the tract itself is developed. See MANDELKER,
supra note 13, § 6.64. Voluntary conditional open space zoning also stands in con-
trast to the involuntary exactions sometimes authorized by land-use planning legisla-
tion. See id § 9.11.
314. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140 (App. 1993).
315. Id. at 142.
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developer's density was limited to the existing fifty-nine units
and, at that point, it abandoned the project. 16 Distinguishing
Twain Harte Associates, Ltd. v. County of Tuolumne17 and
Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz from the case at
issue,"' the appellate court sustained the city's action." It
saw the zoning of the 1.97 acre tract as uniform with the larger
tract in which it was included.32 Under existing zoning, previ-
ously permitted uses, including open space and educational
institutions, remained.32' The court recognized that "preser-
vation of some open space amidst populated areas [was] a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power, intended to protect area resi-
dents from the negative effects of excessive urbanization."322
In American Dredging Co. v. New Jersey,32 existing zoning
for the landowner's 2500 acre tract limited development to fifty
percent.324 It also required "open space" designation for a por-
tion of the property." As a result, the state's wetland statute,
which applied to only eighty acres of the entire tract and left
open the possibility for a development permit, created no com-
pensable burden.326 Lands affected by the wetlands statute
easily could be used to meet the separate open space obliga-
tion.2 7 Classification as "open space," however, is not always a
preexisting consideration. In Taylor v. Village of North Palm
316. See id.
317. 265 Cal. Rptr. 737 (App. 1990).
318. 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (App. 1982).
319. Ramona Convent, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46. Twain Harte and Aptos Seascape
involved situations in which the government entity created different zones within a
single parcel and restricted development in part of the property. See id. In contrast,
in Ramona Convent, the city did not zone the 1.97 acre tract differently from the
rest of the larger parcel. See id. at 146.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 147.
322. Id.; see generally Taylor v. Village of N. Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (balancing preexisting use issues with a community's need for
open space); American Dredging Co. v. New Jersey, 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (balancing the interests of a community's need for open space with
the provisions of a state wetland statute).
323. 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
324. See id. at 43-44.
325. See id. at 43.
326. See id. at 44.
327. See id.
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Beach," the village promulgated a new comprehensive plan
changing formerly designated commercial use areas into "conser-
vation/open space."329 Although the owner resorted to a takings
claim, he was unsuccessful.3 0 He had sought neither an excep-
tion to the new designation nor a development permit.33'
D. Special Use Permits
Another tool to balance competing interests is the special use
permit. In general, special use permits apply to proposed uses
which are, overall, in conformance with the applicable zoning
requirements but which require some special considerations. 32
They may be of more broad utility than an outright "variance"
because the latter relies on meeting a rigorous standard of show-
ing hardship." Depending on the jurisdiction, however, the
special exception may not create a continuing entitlement in the
face of changing zoiing regulations. In O'Donnell v. Bassler,3 4
the special exception permit did not protect commercial aircraft
operations authorized under previously existing zoning regula-
tions.33  Similarly, in Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v.
Gaithersburg,33 a batch plant holding a special exception per-
mit was exposed to the risk of subsequent reclassification of
permissible uses in the zone.3 '
328. 659 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
329. See id. at 1169.
330. See id. at 1170-74.
331. See id. at 1174.
332. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(i) (Michie Supp. 1996).
333. See, e.g., id. § 15.1-430(p) (providing that a variance is appropriate when strict
application of the zoning ordinance would result in "unnecessary or unreasonable
hardship").
334. 425 A.2d 1003 (Md. 1981).
335. See id& at 1010 (holding that the local board had authority to issue a permit,
and that the circuit court could not substitute its judgment in setting aside the con-
ditions administratively imposed by the board).
336. 291 A.2d 672 (Md. 1972).
337. See id. at 676-77. Notwithstanding a prior court order that the landowner
should have its application for a special exception, the company had not obtained a
building permit and had not begun construction before the local municipality placed
the batch use into a prohibited category on the basis of public health and safety
concerns. See id. at 677. Under Maryland law, a vested expectancy requires a permit
or occupancy certificate and action on the permit such that the neighborhood is
placed on notice that the land is being devoted to that use. See id. at 676. As these
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In Virginia, the zoning statute authorizes local ordinances to
include provisions for special exceptions."' In Bell v. City
Council,39 the court distinguished special use exceptions from
variances.340 The special use exception would not cover a pro-
posed use inconsistent with the local ordinance: the use must
conform to the comprehensive plan and have no undue adverse
impact on the surrounding neighborhood."' Its purpose would
be to allow the owner to develop consistently with the ordinance,
provided that certain conditions were met.342 Virginia cases,
unlike Maryland cases, indicate that when the special use per-
mit is coupled with good faith reliance and substantial invest-
ment, the use will be protected against subsequent zoning re-
classification. 3
E. Variances
Unlike conditional zoning and special use exceptions, the local
variance is a hardship device. As is true with the other tools, the
grant of a variance is discretionary with the local authority. In
Francini v. Zoning Board Appeals,' for instance, a local Con-
necticut zoning board denied a variance to construct a year-
round home inconsistent with lot size limitations. 5
The board concluded only that construction of such a dwelling
on the property would not be in harmony with the other,
mostly seasonal, dwellings in the area, and that the plaintiffs
conditions had not occurred, the exception conferred no protection against the zoning
reclassification. See id. at 677.
338. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(c) (Michie Supp. 1996).
339. 297 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1982).
340. See id. at 813-14.
341. See id. at 814.
342. See id.
343. See Board of Supervisors v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Va. 1972)
(barring rezoning when the defendant had obtained a special use permit for a gas
station, purchased property, incurred preparation and site plan expense, and relied
in good faith on the current system); see also Board of Supervisors v. Medical Struc-
tures, Inc., 192 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Va. 1972) (barring rezoning after the defendant had
obtained a special use permit and a site plan and invested substantial sums in the
project).
344. 639 A.2d 519 (Conn. 1994).
345. See id. at 520.
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year round use of a septic system could pose a health hazard
to his neighbors. The minutes of the meeting on the plaintiffs
application for a variance, however, reflect the board's view
that construction of a seasonal home on the property would
constitute a reasonable alternative use of the lot in conformi-
ty with the existing development of the area.'
Under Virginia's approach, boards of zoning appeals, which
are required for jurisdictions that have zoning ordinances, are
authorized to grant variances from the terms of an ordinance
when doing so is not contrary to the public interest." A hard-
ship showing is key to making the case for a variance." a Even
having shown hardship, however, the authorized body is to take
care that the "spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and sub-
stantial justice done."349 Variances are an option for properties
"acquired in good faith," which by reason of their own unique
circumstances or those of adjacent property are ones for which
"strict application" of the ordinance would "effectively prohibit or
unreasonably restrict the utilization of the property" or where
granting the variance would relieve "clearly demonstrable hard-
ship approaching confiscation.3 5 °
Local case law indicates that the zoning board of authority
should consider whether the ordinance's strict application will
produce an unnecessary hardship, whether that hardship is one
not shared by other properties in the zone, and whether grant-
ing the variance will be a substantial detriment to adjoining
properties. 5' In Bell v. City Council,5 ' for instance, the court
described a variance as appropriate when the location or shape
of the property or other considerations demonstrated the statu-
346. Id. at 523.
347. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(2) (Michie Supp. 1996).
348. See id. § 15.1-495(2)(a).
349. Id. § 15.1-495(2).
350. Id.
351. See Prince William County Bd. of Zoning Appeals v. Bond, 300 S.E.2d 781,
782-83 (Va. 1983) (holding that economic impact is not a dispositive concern and
that the landowner's limitation of use to one dwelling was not a hardship for vari-
ance purposes; as a result, the request in essence was an application for a rezon-
ing-a purely legislative function).
352. 297 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1982).
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torily required hardship.353 Unlike special exceptions in some
states, a variance does not, alone, insulate a permitted use
against subsequent change in land-use classifications."s
F. Vested Rights
This Article has now touched on the basic premises of an or-
derly local land-use planning and implementation structure.355
It has outlined the basic local tools for adjusting remaining ten-
sions between the community consensus and individual land
use: conditional zoning,356  special use permits,357  varianc-
es,35 8 nonconforming uses,359  and amortization."' These
tools promote accommodation, adjusting the fit between common
goals and individual expectancy. In varying ways, they attempt
to either reconcile new uses with preexisting planning or afford
preexisting expectancies an opportunity to survive changes in
majoritarian planning.
Variances, nonconforming uses, and amortization approach the
353. See id. at 813-14 (stating that a variance allows the property owner to do
"what is otherwise not allowed under the ordinance"; in contrast, a special exception
applies to uses consistent with the ordinance but which require the approval of the
zoning authority with regard to the meeting of specified conditions).
354. See id. In another case, Snow u. Amherst County Board of Zoning Appeals,
448 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1994), the court held that a variance from setback restrictions
was not a significant official governmental act for purposes of claiming a vested
right to build on property subsequently included in a watershed district, where con-
struction was prohibited by ordinance. See id. at 607-08. The court also found that
in Virginia:
a landowner who seeks to establish a vested property right in a land use
classification must identify a significant official governmental act that is
manifested by the issuance of a permit or other approval authorizing the
landowner to conduct a use on his property that otherwise would not
have been allowed.
Id. Additionally, and equally importantly, the court held that the landowner had es-
tablished that he pursued diligently the use that the government permit or approval
authorized and that the landowner incurred substantial expense in good faith prior
to the change in zoning. See id. To assert a vested property right, a landowner must
establish all three elements just listed. See id.
355. See supra Parts IV-V.
356. See supra Part V.C.
357. See supra Part V.D.
358. See supra Part V.E.
359. See supra Part V.A.
360. See supra Part V.B.
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concern in different ways but each provides a basis for determin-
ing when a preexisting expectancy will be recognized by the local
majority as entitled to survive changing planning goals. With the
perspectives these tools offer, this Article closes by analyzing
their conceptual local sibling, the concept of a "vested right."
In local land-use planning, the concept of a vested right
emerges somewhere along a continuum between policies that
simply encourage reliance and those that, perhaps more philo-
sophically but no less pragmatically, pursue the integrity of indi-
vidual right in "property." In Virginia, the land-use statute
makes clear that local jurisdictions may not deprive landowners
of their vested rights. 6' In determining whether a vested right
exists, reliance theory involves a fact-specific inquiry. In general,
the courts survey the particular government action, whether the
reliance is in good faith, and whether the landowner's in-
vestment has been, in light of the overall project, substantial
and continuing. 62 Within this matrix, the courts evaluate the
public's interests and the landowner's right to use and consider
whether the activities were undertaken under the aegis of a val-
id land-use approval, such as a building permit. This balancing
approach used by local courts is similar to the balancing ap-
proach used by the Supreme Court in defining the constitutional
boundaries of local land-use planning powers.
In Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission,"m
landowners acquired no vested right by reason of construction of
a townhome in the District of Columbia when they had notice of
planned use development limitations through closing and title
documents.3  In Snow v. Amherst County Board of Zoning Ap-
361. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492 (Michie 1989).
362. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, 192 S.E.2d 799,801 (Va. 1972).
363. 662 A.2d 191 (D.C. 1995).
364. See id. at 193. "A purchaser is held to be on inquiry notice where he or she
is aware of circumstances which generate enough uncertainty about the state of title
that a person of ordinary prudence would inquire further about those circumstances."
Id. (quoting Clay Properties, Inc. v. Washington Post Co., 604 A.2d 890, 895 (D.C.
1992)). Estoppel elements in the District are: "(1) expensive and permanent improve-
ments, (2) made in good faith, (3) in justifiable and reasonable reliance upon, (4)
affirmative acts of the District government, (5) without notice that the improvements
might violate the zoning regulations, and (6) equities that strongly favor the peti-
tioners." Id. at 193 n.1.
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peals," the court concluded that a variance that allowed set-
backs beyond those that the ordinance permitted did not create
a vested right to build a watershed."s Subdivision platting and
a subdivision itself were not enoukh to give rise to a vested right
in a recent Maryland case. 67 Similarly, in Town of Stephens
City v. Russell,36 the filing of a proposed subdivision plat and
site plan, without approval, was not enough to anchor a vested
right against downzoning.369 In another case, a landowner's re-
liance on the advice of a state agency to move forward with
studies for construction of a nonhazardous waste landfill con-
fronted later county zoning that precluded the landfill. Again,
the agency's advice was insufficient to secure a vested right. °
Preliminary land-use planning was not enough in Georgia371
and not .enough in South Carolina. 72 Land acquisition was not
enough in Town of Vienna Council v. Kohler37 and preliminary
365. 448 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1994).
366. See id. at 608.
367. Montgomery County v. Waters Landing Ltd. Partnership, 635 A.2d 48, 59 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1994) ("There is nothing in Montgomery County's regulations that
give a party a vested right to acquire a building permit simply because the Planning
Commission approved the subdivision of property."); see also Washington Suburban
Sanitary Comm'n v. TKU Assocs., 376 A.2d 505, 516 (Md. 1977) (holding that dedi-
cation of a right of way did not vest rights against subsequent rezoning absent a
showing that an authority knew that a sewer permit would not issue or absent a
showing that the county's regulations guaranteed that zoning would not change).
368. 399 S.E.2d 814 (Va. 1991).
369. See id. at 816.
370. See Notestein v. Board of Supervisors, 393 S.E.2d 205, 207-08 (Va. 1990)
(holding that a significant government action was required to permit a use not oth-
erwise allowable).
371. See Cohn Communities, Inc. v. Clayton County, 359 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ga.
1987) (holding that when a landowner makes a substantial change in position by
fronting expenditures in reliance on the probability of the issuance of a permit based
upon assurances of zoning officials, a vested right can arise; ultimately, however, the
court held that the alleged "representation" was merely a letter from the county
planner stating the tract's current zoning).
372. See Whitfield v. Seabrook, 190 S.E.2d 743, 745-46 (S.C. 1972) (holding that
expenditures made before the issuance of a building permit were not made in reli-
ance on it).
373. 244 S.E.2d 542, 548 (Va. 1978) (noting, however, that the town's decision de-
nying rezoning to permit townhouse clusters and instead granting rezoning to single-
family residences showed no relationship to the health, safety, and welfare of the
community and was thus invalid; accordingly, an injunction was issued to protect
the cluster use).
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planning that was not directed to actual construction was not
enough in Nashua, New Hampshire. 74 Even the investment of
one million dollars in studies and development plans may not be
enough. 5
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp.376 addressed "equita-
ble estoppel vesting." The landowner encountered a density re-
duction after the town earlier had approved a rezoning allowing
for multiple-family zoning, knowing that the developer was rely-
ing on the town's determination.77 Defining the elements of
equitable estoppel for zoning purposes as reliance in good faith
on an act or omission of the government accompanied by a sub-
stantial change in position or extensive obligations or expenses,
the Florida court protected the developer from a reduction to
single-family use. 8' Finally, unauthorized government actions,
generally, will not give rise to a vested right.7 9
Under different factual circumstances, courts have found a
vested right. Where a permit was continuously reissued over an
eighteen-year period for unrestricted construction with govern-
ment knowledge of continuing investment, a vested right at-
tached." ° Approval of a preliminary and final subdivision plan
374. See Gosselin v. City of Nashua, 321 A.2d 593, 596 (N.H. 1974) (holding that
incurring substantial expenses for planning, architecture, and engineering, where
these were not directly related to actual construction of the proposed shopping cen-
ter, did not create a vested right).
375. See County Council v. District Land Corp., 337 A2d 712, 721 (Md. 1975) (stat-
ing that possession of a building permit together with spending one million dollars
on studies and plans for development of property, in reliance on existing zoning, cre-
ated no vested right where there was not actual construction).
376. 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
377. See id. at 572.
378. See id. at 572-573.
379. Compare Gunkel v. City of Emporia, 835 F.2d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1987)
(stating that a building permit issued by mistake conferred no vested expectancy)
with City of Berea v. Wren, 818 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
when a permit was issued as a result of an "honest error" misreading of the official
zoning map, the court protected the expectancy because the error was an honest one
and was not raised until over a year after the permit was issued and after the
property owner had expended substantial monies in site preparation).
380. See Equity Resources, Inc. v. County of Leon, 643 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that where a phased project is planned, Florida has
"upheld vested rights in the zoning for the entire project without any showing that
costs incurred ... in planning and commencing construction [could] be exclusively
attributed to each and every part of the overall project").
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vested a right to develop against a subsequent ordinance amend-
ment and rejection of the site plan.381' An approved site plan
protected the' land use against a prospective moratorium.382
Where construction had progressed substantially on the basis of
an approved building permit, the permit could not later be can-
celled because the structure exceeded maximum lot occupan-
cy.-3 The court in Fifteen Fifty North State Building Corp. v.
City of Chicago3 4 sustained a vested right where an architec-
tural contract and expenditures of approximately two hundred
thousand dollars had occurred."s In Board of Supervisors v.
Medical Structures, Inc.,386 the combination of a site plan, dili-
gent development activities, substantial investment, and a spe-
cial use permit protected a nursing home against subsequent
zoning change. 87 Similarly, in Board of Supervisors v. Cities
Service Oil Co.,s" good faith reliance on existing zoning, prepa-
ration and site plan expenses, and a special use permit protected
the gas station use.389 Finally, where the histories of two parts
of a tract differ, differing conclusions can govern each parcel. In
Prince George's County v. Equitable Trust Co.,390 issuance of a
building permit and the beginning of substantial construction
protected .8 acres of a tract but subdivision alone did not protect
the remaining 11.2 acres.39'
Reliance or equitable vesting, although sensitive to the justice
of the particular dispute, provides, at best, rough predictability.
381. See B. & W. Assocs. v. Planning Bd., 575 A.2d 1371, 1372 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1990) (stating that the statute does not allow such changes in the "rules
of the game" in the face of justifiable reliance).
382. See Harlow v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 479 A.2d 808, 812 (Conn. 1984)
(stating that the previously pending application was not a "future" application within
the scope of the moratorium on site plan approvals).
383. See Saah v. District of Columbia Bd., 433 A.2d 1114, 1116-17 (D.C. 1981).
384. 155 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. 1959).
385. See id. at 101-02 (stating that obligations and expenditures incurred in reli-
ance on a building permit under an ordinance authorizing use of land for a 25-story
apartment building created a vested right).
386. 192 S.E.2d 799 (Va. 1972).
387. See id. at 801.
388. 193 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1972).
389. See id. at 3.
390. 408 A.2d 737 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970).
391. See id. at 743.
1096
CHANGE IN LOCAL LAND USE
In that sense, equitable vesting is distinguishable by degree
from variances, nonconforming use policies, and amortization.
Because of the only rough predictability that equitable vesting
provides, some jurisdictions have enacted statutory vesting
structures.392 These statutes pinpoint specific stages of the zon-
ing and development process as sufficient to vest interests.9 '
In North Carolina, for example, failure to comply with the re-
quirements of statutory vesting leaves the use exposed to
change.394 Moreover, in some states, the statutory system may
provide for a period during which its protection exists and after
which it lapses. 95
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article's purpose has been to survey the local land-use
planning landscape. By referencing the stresses on the Washing-
ton metropolitan area, the Article highlighted the continuing
challenges of accommodating growth and expectancy. To meet
these challenges, local interests have developed a broad menu of
devices, from the general to the precise, for attempting to bal-
ance change and expectancy. Local courts, council members, zon-
ing officials, planners, and landowners operate within these
frameworks in the practical day-to-day world.
As this Article has attempted to illustrate, it is in this day-to-
day world that the fundamentals of change and expectancy are
played out. Constitutional cases have long provided outer bound-
aries. Against this backdrop, millions of local land-use decisions
have been reached with few disputes sufficiently intense to trig-
ger Supreme Court attention. Even so, the Court has played a
392. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-344.1, 160A-385.1 (Michie 1995).
393. See id. §§ 153A-344.1(c), 160A-385.1(c).
394. See id.; see also Nello L. Teer Co. v. Orange County, 810 F. Supp. 679, 688-89
(M.D.N.C. 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part, 993 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpub-
lished table opinion), available in 1993 WL 177872 (holding that stone quarry use
was not protected against zoning change); Simpson v. City of Charlotte, 443 S.E.2d
772, 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that under the statute, a construction permit
was not equivalent to a building permit for purposes of vesting).
395. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508 (West Supp. 1996); see also In re
Sterners Mill Assocs., 430 A.2d 371, 372 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (three-year protec-
tion period after which ownership reverts to the position of the one first seeking
approval).
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vital role in defining constitutional land-use law. The struggle
between change and expectancy, while generally handled at the
local level, has also been a constant thread running through the
Court's cases.
The vitality and primacy of local land-use planning structures,
as highlighted throughout this Article, indicates that a broad
array of options for addressing still-evolving local land-use con-
cerns remain available for individuals and local planners. This
vital local land-use world is comforting. The continuing struggle,
it seems, is the norm, not the exception. It has prompted con-
stant change and innovation. One lesson from the Court's recent
cases may be simply to remind us of the societal importance of
this delicate art of local land-use balancing.
